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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Lesandro Perez pled guilty to federal firearm and drug 
offenses arising from, among other things, selling guns to an 
undercover law enforcement officer.  The Sentencing 
Guidelines recommended between 84 and 105 months’ 
imprisonment for Perez’s crimes.  But at the Government’s 
urging, the District Court applied a sentencing enhancement 
that brought Perez’s recommended prison time up to 121 to 
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151 months.  The reason?  The undercover officer observed 
that Perez had guns and drugs together in the same room.  
  
We now decide whether the mere physical proximity 
between guns and drugs is enough to justify the significant 
increase in Perez’s Guidelines range.  We hold that it is not.  
While the Commentary to the Guidelines, on which the District 
Court relied, deserves deference, we are persuaded that the 
Court misapplied it in this instance.  We believe the 
Commentary creates a rebuttable presumption, rather than a 
bright-line rule, that the enhancement should apply when a 
defendant possesses guns and drugs together.  We therefore 
vacate the District Court’s judgment and sentence and remand 
for further proceedings. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Over a six-month period in 2017, Perez sold firearms 
and controlled substances to various confidential informants 
and undercover officers.  On March 9, 2017, he sold two 
firearms to an undercover officer.1  Perez kept those guns 
under a mattress in the room where he conducted the 
transaction.  During it the officer observed drugs, drug-
packaging materials, and drug paraphernalia in the same room 
as the two guns.   
 
Perez was later charged in three separate indictments in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, all involving sales of guns 
or drugs.  One of the indictments concerned the March 9th 
 
1 Perez also sold a third firearm that day to the undercover 




transaction.  Perez ultimately pled guilty to all three 
indictments.  The Sentencing Guidelines range was 121 to 151 
months, based on a total offense level of 29 and a criminal 
history of IV.  This calculation included a four-level 
enhancement per U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016), which 
applies when the defendant “used or possessed any 
firearm . . . in connection with another felony offense.”  While 
there were numerous other sales in the three indictments, the 
Government conceded that the March 9th transaction was the 
only arguable basis for the enhancement.   
 
Perez objected to the enhancement at sentencing, 
arguing that he did not use the guns “in connection with” his 
felony drug-trafficking offense because he was merely offering 
the guns for sale in the same room as the drugs.  But the District 
Court overruled the objection and concluded that the 
enhancement applied because the guns “were in close 
proximity to drugs and . . . drug material.”  App. 109.  The 
Court thus applied the initial total offense level of 29 and 
criminal history of IV, and sentenced Perez to 121 months’ 
imprisonment followed by five years’ supervised release.  On 
appeal, he renews his argument that the four-level 
enhancement does not apply because he possessed the firearms 
to sell them, and thus they should not be deemed as used or 
possessed in connection with a drug-trafficking offense based 
solely on their close proximity to drugs.   
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
this prosecution for federal crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
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have jurisdiction to review Perez’s sentence under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
 
When a defendant does not contest the facts of his 
offense, we review without deference a district court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines.  United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 
49, 54 (3d Cir. 2020).  Here, Perez does not contest the facts of 
the March 9th transaction.  Rather, he argues that the District 
Court made a legal error in interpreting the Guidelines to 
require a four-level enhancement any time guns are physically 
near drugs or drug paraphernalia.  We thus conduct a fresh 
review of the Court’s decision.2  
 
2 The Government argues that we review the District Court’s 
decision for only clear error under United States v. Richards, 
674 F.3d 215, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2012).  But in Richards “the 
District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines [was] not 
really at issue,” as the defendant did not contest the Court’s 
“articulation” of the Guidelines standard.  Id. at 218; see also 
Bell, 947 F.3d at 54 (discussing the factual nature of the 
Richard Court’s inquiry).  In contrast, we have often held that 
we review anew a district court’s legal interpretation of the 
Guidelines.  See, e.g., United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 144, 156 
(3d Cir. 2020) (en banc); United States v. Metro, 882 F.3d 431, 
437 (3d Cir. 2018).  And before us is not a situation in which 
the Guidelines “set[] forth a predominantly fact-driven test” 
such that “the legal issue decided by the district court is, in 
essence, a factual question.”  United States v. Thung Van 
Huynh, 884 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Richards, 674 F.3d at 220, 223).  Perez is complaining 
about a purely legal error with no factual component at all.  We 





III.  ANALYSIS 
Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines 
requires a four-level sentencing enhancement in cases where a 
defendant “used or possessed any firearm . . . in connection 
with another felony offense.”  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016).  
The Sentencing Commission’s Commentary to this provision, 
however, applies different rules based on the type of other 
felony involved.  By default, the enhancement applies under 
Note 14(A) of the Commentary “if the firearm . . . facilitated, 
or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.”  
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A) 
(U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016).   
 
But when the other felony offense is drug trafficking, 
Note 14(B) creates a special rule: The four-level enhancement 
applies as long as the firearm “is found in close proximity to 
drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia.”  
Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B).  This special rule is justified “because 
the presence of the firearm has the potential of facilitating 
another felony offense.”  Id. 
 
Because Perez’s other felony was a drug-trafficking 
offense, the District Court applied the more severe rule in Note 
14(B).  And the Court took a broad view of that rule, 
concluding that Perez used or possessed guns in connection 
with a drug-trafficking offense because he kept them in close 
proximity to drugs and drug paraphernalia.  We must therefore 
decide what weight, if any, to give Note 14(B) as an 
interpretation of the “in connection with” requirement of 
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§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).  We then turn to whether the District Court 
properly applied Note 14(B) in this case. 
 
A. The Auer deference framework applies to 
Sentencing Guidelines    Commentary. 
The “plain and unambiguous language” of the 
Guidelines is the best course for their interpretation.  United 
States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 556 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993)).  But 
“[t]he extent to which the [G]uidelines’ [C]ommentary 
controls our interpretation of the [G]uidelines themselves is 
informed by principles of administrative law.”  United States 
v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), petition 
for cert. filed on other grounds, 89 U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S. Apr. 
30, 2021) (No. 20-1522).  The Guidelines “are the equivalent 
of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies,” so 
Commentary is “treated as an agency’s interpretation of its 
own legislative rule.”  Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 
44–45 (1993).  This means the Commentary is subject to the 
rules of Auer deference.  Nasir, 982 F.3d at 157; see also id. at 
157 n.12 (citing, among others, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 
(1997)).  Under this standard, Commentary “that interprets or 
explains a [G]uideline is authoritative unless it violates the 
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 
plainly erroneous reading of, that [G]uideline.”  Stinson, 508 
U.S. at 38. 
 
However, the Supreme Court recently articulated 
several limitations on Auer deference in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. 
Ct. 2400 (2019).  First, an agency’s interpretation of its own 
rules is entitled to that deference “only if a regulation is 
genuinely ambiguous.”  Id. at 2414.  But before so concluding, 
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“a court must exhaust all the traditional tools of construction.”  
Id. at 2415 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Second, if a 
regulation is genuinely ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation 
must be reasonable.  Id.  And third, even if an agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable, “a court must make an 
independent inquiry into whether the character and context of 
the agency interpretation entitle[] it to controlling weight.”  Id. 
at 2416.  Of special importance in this analysis is whether the 
interpretation is the agency’s “authoritative” or “official 
position,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted); whether it 
“implicate[s] [the agency’s] substantive expertise,” id. at 2417; 
and whether it “reflects [the agency’s] fair and considered 
judgment”—that is, the interpretation cannot be a “convenient 
litigating position” or a “post hoc rationalizatio[n]” for past 
agency action, id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
We applied this scaled-back approach to the Guidelines’ 
Commentary in United States v. Nasir, emphasizing that the 
plain text of the Guidelines should control unless the language 
is genuinely ambiguous.  982 F.3d at 158–60.  We 
acknowledged that previous Supreme Court precedent seemed 
to allow Commentary to expand the scope of the Guidelines 
beyond the Guidelines text itself “if the [G]uideline which the 
commentary interprets will bear the construction.”  Id. at 157 
(quoting Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46).  But we joined the Sixth 
Circuit in concluding that “separation-of-powers concerns 
advise against any interpretation of the [C]ommentary that 
expands the substantive law set forth in the [G]uidelines 
themselves.”  Id. at 159; see also id. (citing United States v. 





Under Kisor, then, as interpreted by our Court in Nasir, 
we afford the Guidelines’ Commentary Auer deference when 
the Guidelines’ language is ambiguous, the Commentary itself 
is reasonable, and the “character and context” of the 
Commentary “entitle[] it to controlling weight.”  Kisor, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2414–17.  We must also be wary of Commentary that 
“expands the substantive law set forth in the [G]uidelines 
themselves,” and we should apply the plain text of the 
Guidelines whenever possible.  Nasir, 982 F.3d at 159–60. 
 
B. Note 14(B) is entitled to Auer deference. 
i. Kisor Steps One and Three 
With these principles in mind, we turn to Guideline 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and Commentary Note 14(B).  We first 
decide whether the Guideline is “genuinely ambiguous” before 
relying on the Commentary.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.  
Again, § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides that a four-level 
enhancement applies if the defendant “used or possessed any 
firearm . . . in connection with another felony offense” 
(emphasis added).  Perez argues that because the “in 
connection with” language of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) plainly 
requires “some relationship between the gun and the drug 
offense,” the Guideline itself is unambiguous.  Perez’s Br. at 
14. 
 
We disagree.  We may only conclude that the Guideline 
is ambiguous after we have “exhaust[ed] all the traditional 
tools of construction.”  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus we “carefully consider[] the 
text, structure, history, and purpose” of the Guideline.  Id. 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
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also Nasir, 982 F.3d at 158.  None of these considerations 
weigh against finding ambiguity here, and two weigh 
particularly in favor. 
 
First, the text.  We have yet to consider whether 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) is genuinely ambiguous under Kisor.  That 
said, we have previously observed, before Note 14’s addition 
to the Commentary in 2006, that the phrase “in connection 
with” is “notable for its vagueness and pliability.”  United 
States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281, 283 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. West, 643 
F.3d 102, 112 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing the addition of Note 
14).  Indeed, “no simple judicial formula can adequately 
capture the precise contours of the ‘in connection with’ 
requirement, particularly in light of the myriad factual contexts 
in which the phrase might come into play.”  Loney, 219 F.3d at 
284 (quoting United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 247 (7th 
Cir. 1996)).  We have nonetheless spoken of its “broad[]” and 
“expansive[]” meaning.  See id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus the text of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) suggests, but does 
not establish, its ambiguity. 
 
What confirms the Guideline’s ambiguity is the history 
of its text.  After our first attempt to define the phrase “in 
connection with,” the Sentencing Commission added Note 14 
to the Commentary to “address a growing conflict among 
circuits regarding the interpretation of § 2K2.1(b)(6).”  See 
West, 643 F.3d at 112; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual app. C (commenting, in Amendment 691, that Note 14 
was adopted to “address[] a circuit conflict pertaining to the 
application of” § 2K2.1(b)(6)).  This conflict was based, at 
least in part, on disagreement concerning whether the phrase 
“in connection with” encompassed those cases where the 
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firearm’s presence was merely accidental or coincidental.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Young, 115 F.3d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 
1997).  And this disagreement continues among circuit courts 
today.  See infra Section III.C.  We are therefore persuaded by 
the text and history of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) that the Guideline is 
ambiguous and meets Kisor’s first requirement. 
 
As for Kisor step three, Note 14(B) meets its 
requirements because its character and context entitle it to 
controlling weight.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416–17.  The 
parties do not contest that the Note is the Sentencing 
Commission’s official position or that it implicates the 
Commission’s substantive expertise.  See id.  The parties also 
do not argue that the Commission’s views as provided in the 
Note are “merely [a] convenient litigating position” created for 
this or another case.  See id. at 2417 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We concur that the Commentary meets these three 
markers, and nothing about its character or context counsels 
against deference.  See id. at 2416–17.  Hence Note 14(B) 
meets Kisor step three. 
 
ii. Kisor Step Two 
So we are left with step two: whether, under Kisor, Note 
14(B) is reasonable.  According to Perez, the “in connection 
with” language of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) requires a relationship 
between the guns and drugs.  But Note 14(B), he contends, 
mandates that the enhancement applies any time guns and 
drugs are in close physical proximity to each other even if there 
is no relationship between them.  Perez thus argues that the 
Note conflicts with the Guideline and is therefore an 




We agree that the Note would be unreasonable if it 
applied in the way Perez argues (which is also the way the 
District Court appeared to apply it).  But we are not convinced 
it is so unforgiving.  Our conclusion rests in part on the origin 
of the language the Sentencing Commission chose for the 
Note, which indicates that the “potential to facilitate” 
requirement necessarily excludes cases in which the presence 
of firearms was merely accidental. 
 
We begin with the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith 
v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).  There the Court 
considered 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which requires certain 
penalties if the defendant, “during and in relation to any crime 
of violence or drug trafficking crime[,] . . . uses or carries a 
firearm.”  See id. at 227.  As the defendant in that case did not 
dispute that he used a firearm “during” a drug-trafficking 
offense, the Court focused in part on whether his use of the 
firearm was “in relation to” the other offense.  Id. at 237. 
 
While the Court declined to “determine the precise 
contours” of the provision, id. at 238, it 
 
clarifie[d] that the firearm must 
have some purpose or effect with 
respect to the drug trafficking 
crime; its presence or involvement 
cannot be the result of accident or 
coincidence. . . . [T]he “in relation 
to” language “allay[s] explicitly 
the concern that a person could be” 
punished under § 924(c)(1) for 
committing a drug trafficking 
offense “while in possession of a 
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firearm” even though the firearm’s 
presence is coincidental or entirely 
“unrelated” to the crime.  Instead, 
the gun at least must “facilitat[e], 
or ha[ve] the potential of 
facilitating,” the drug trafficking 
offense. 
Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  The Court ultimately concluded that the defendant, 
who had traded a gun for drugs, met the “in relation to” 
requirement.  Id.  This was because the gun’s presence “was an 
integral part of the [drug] transaction” rather than “the product 
of happenstance.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 We built on Smith’s approach in United States v. Loney, 
219 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2000), which we decided before the 
Sentencing Commission added Note 14 to the Guidelines’ 
Commentary.  Loney held that the enhancement in 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (then § 2K2.1(b)(5)) applied when the 
defendant was arrested with twenty-nine packets of heroin and 
a loaded pistol on his person.  Id. at 283.  The defendant argued 
that “in connection with” required “some causal nexus” 
between the gun and the other felony, but we rejected his 
proposed standard.  Id. at 285.  Rather, we determined that “in 
connection with” meant there had to be “some relationship or 
association” between the firearm and the other felony, which 
could be “a causal or logical relation or other type of 
relationship.”  Id. at 284. 
 
In so holding, we relied significantly on Smith by 
acknowledging that it considered the phrase “in relation to,” 
rather than “in connection with,” and that the two phrases may 
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not be fully synonymous.  Id. at 287.  Nonetheless, we adopted 
the Smith Court’s reasoning insofar as both phrases “ensure[]” 
that the firearm’s “presence or involvement . . .  cannot be the 
result of accident or coincidence.”  Id. at 286 (quoting Smith, 
508 U.S. at 238).  We thus held that the “in connection with” 
requirement would exclude situations in which “the presence 
of the gun was merely ‘accidental,’ had no ‘purpose or effect 
with respect to’ [the defendant’s] drug offense, or did not 
‘facilitate or have the potential of facilitating’ [the defendant’s] 
drug dealing.”  Id. at 287–88 (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 238). 
 
Applying these principles, Loney stated that “when a 
defendant has a loaded gun on his person while caught in the 
midst of a crime that involves in-person transactions, whether 
involving drugs or not, a district judge can reasonably infer that 
there is a relationship between the gun and the offense.”  Id. at 
288.  In contrast, we acknowledged there may not be a 
relationship between a firearm and a drug offense when, for 
example, a drug dealer has a “hunting rifle buried in his closet,” 
even if the gun was present “around his drug dealing.”  Id. at 
289.  We thus concluded that “physical proximity alone may 
be insufficient in some cases” to establish a relationship 
between guns and drugs.  Id. 
 
We next considered the language of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) in 
United States v. West, 643 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2011), which we 
decided after the Sentencing Commission adopted Note 14.  
The issue was whether the enhancement in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) 
applied even though the District Court had not made any 
specific findings that the revolver “facilitated or had the 
potential to facilitate” the defendant’s drug possession under 
Note 14(A).  See id. at 115.  Thus West concerned drug 
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possession under subsection (A) rather than drug trafficking 
under subsection (B).  Id. at 113–14.   
 
We adopted the approaches of the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eighth Circuits in holding that, “in a simple possession case, 
the sentencing court must make a specific finding that the 
firearm facilitated or had the potential of facilitating possession 
of the drugs.”  Id. at 114.  But we emphasized that mere 
physical proximity would not be enough to support such a 
finding.  Id. at 116.  We relied on Smith and Loney in holding 
that “[w]hile a weapon’s physical proximity to narcotics may 
be sufficient to show a connection between the weapon and the 
drug charges in some cases, . . . where the predicate drug 
offense is possession, mere proximity is insufficient to 
establish the required nexus.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
Note 14(B), however, created different rules for drug-
trafficking cases; in that circumstance, a sentencing court could 
“presume” that a firearm was used “in connection with” the 
drug-trafficking offense based on physical proximity.  Id. at 
114. 
 
Although they do not directly address Note 14(B), the 
decisions in Smith, Loney, and West lead us to several helpful 
conclusions.  The first is that the “potential to facilitate” 
requirement, which originated in Smith and is now part of 
subsection (B), excludes those cases in which the firearm’s 
presence is “the result of accident or coincidence.”  Smith, 508 
U.S. at 238; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. 
C (noting, in Amendment 691, that Note 14 adopts language 
from Smith).  Note 14(B) therefore aligns with both Smith and 
our pre-Note decision in Loney, where we held that the “in 
connection with” language of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) created an 
identical requirement.  Loney, 219 F.3d at 287 (citing Smith, 
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508 U.S. at 238).  Given this significant overlap, we cannot say 
that Note 14(B) is unreasonable as written.  It is therefore 
entitled to Auer deference. 
 
But Loney and West lead us to another significant 
conclusion—that “physical proximity alone may be 
insufficient in some cases” to establish that the firearm had the 
potential to facilitate drug activity.  Id. at 289; see also West, 
643 F.3d at 116; accord United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318, 
321 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming that “[p]ossession of firearms 
that is merely coincidental to the underlying felony offense is 
insufficient to support the application of § 2K2.1” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  This standard requires “some 
relationship” between the firearm and the defendant’s drug 
offense.  Loney, 219 F.3d at 286.  And while West dealt 
specifically with drug-possession offenses, see 643 F.3d at 
116, the drug possessor and the drug trafficker alike could 
coincidentally have a hunting rifle buried in a closet, see Loney, 
219 F.3d. at 289.  So our conclusion in West—which was itself 
a reaffirmation of Loney—applies with similar force here. 
 
We are further persuaded that the “relationship” 
standard in Loney and West is the correct one because the 
Sentencing Commission itself adopted it.  In 2014 the 
Commission adopted Note 14(E), which provides in relevant 
part that “[i]n determining whether subsection[] 
(b)(6)(B) . . . appl[ies], the court must consider the relationship 
between the instant offense and the other offense.”  § 2K2.1 
cmt. n.14(E); see United States v. Harper, 766 F.3d 741, 747 
(7th Cir. 2014) (discussing the 2014 amendment).  While it 
does not spell out precisely how a court must weigh this 
relationship, Note 14(E) further demonstrates that the 
Commission did not intend for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to apply in 
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cases where the firearm’s presence was mere accident or 
coincidence. 
 
Practically speaking, this means that a sentencing court 
cannot stop reading Note 14(B) after the “close proximity” 
language in the first sentence.  It must continue to the second 
sentence, which provides that the Note should apply in cases 
where “the presence of the firearm has the potential of 
facilitating” a drug-trafficking offense.  See § 2K2.1 cmt. 
n.14(B).  And it must further take into account Note 14(E), 
which directs sentencing courts to “consider the relationship” 
between the firearm and drug-trafficking offenses.  See 
§ 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(E).  The Note thus provides some 
“boundaries,” which we explain more fully below, for when 
the enhancement should apply.  See Smith, 508 U.S. at 237.  As 
those boundaries are closely tied to ones approved by the 
Supreme Court in Smith, we do not disturb them.  See id. at 
238. 
 
In sum, Note 14(B) is entitled to Auer deference as a 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous Guideline.  The 
Note incorporates certain “boundaries” laid out by the 
Supreme Court in Smith.  See id. at 237.  Those boundaries 
require a relationship between drug-trafficking activities and 
firearms.  Loney, 219 F.3d at 287.  Hence the enhancement 
does not apply merely because Perez possessed firearms, 







C. Note 14(B) creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
enhancement applies when a firearm is in close 
proximity to drugs or related items. 
 
But we cannot stop there.  Just as the “potential to 
facilitate” language in Note 14(B) has meaning, so too does the 
Note’s “close proximity” requirement.  We see this point most 
clearly when we compare the language of Note 14(B) with that 
of Note 14(A). 
 
Again, Note 14(A) creates a general rule that the 
enhancement in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) should apply if a firearm 
“facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony 
offense.”  § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A).  The Note directly applies the 
Smith standard with no alterations.  See Smith, 508 U.S. at 238.  
But when the other offense is drug trafficking, Note 14(B) 
provides that the enhancement should apply when “a firearm is 
found in close proximity to drugs” or related items, as “the 
presence of the firearm has the potential of facilitating another 
felony offense.”  § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B).  Note 14(B), then, 
creates a special rule for drug traffickers by focusing on the 
proximity between guns and drugs.  This makes it different 
from Note 14(A).  But, like subsection (A), it also adopts the 
“potential to facilitate” language from Smith.  See Smith, 508 
U.S. at 238.  
 
The upshot of this comparison is that we cannot wholly 
collapse the requirements of Note 14(B) into the “potential to 
facilitate” standard from Smith, as Note 14(A) adopts the Smith 
standard as the general rule for all kinds of felony offenses.  
Subsection (B) must mean something different from (A), and 
the “close proximity” language suggests that this distinction 
should center on the physical proximity between the guns and 
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the drugs.  But, as previously discussed, Note 14(B) must also 
account for the limitation in Smith that the presence of the 
firearm cannot be accidental or coincidental.  
 
Given these strictures, we hold that Note 14(B) creates 
a rebuttable presumption that the enhancement should apply 
for a drug-trafficking offense when a firearm is found in close 
proximity to drugs or related items.  We already suggested this 
approach in West, as we said there in a dictum that Note 14(B) 
permits a court to “presume” that, when the underlying felony 
is drug trafficking, § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies when a firearm is 
in close proximity to drugs.  643 F.3d at 114.  Several of our 
sister circuits have used similar language in discussing Note 
14(B).  See, e.g., United States v. Slone, 990 F.3d 568, 572 (7th 
Cir. 2021) (“Application Note 14(B) creates a presumption that 
the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement is warranted whenever 
guns are found in close proximity to drugs . . . or drug 
paraphernalia.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United 
States v. Bolden, 964 F.3d 283, 287 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[U]nder 
Application Note 14(B), a firearm found in close physical 
proximity to drugs presumptively has the potential of 
facilitating the trafficking offense.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Eaden, 914 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th 
Cir. 2019) (observing that Note 14(B) “provide[s] for a 
presumption of facilitation when a firearm is possessed in close 
proximity to a drug trafficking offense”). 
 
This approach incorporates the boundaries suggested by 
the “potential to facilitate” language while also heeding the 
“close proximity” requirement that distinguishes Note 14(B) 
from its companion subsection (A).  Under our understanding 
of subsection (B), a court may presume that a firearm is used 
or possessed in connection with a drug-trafficking offense if 
20 
 
the firearm is found in close proximity to drugs or related 
items.  But because the presumption is rebuttable, a defendant 
may present evidence that the firearm had no relationship to 
drug-related activities (i.e., that the presence of the firearm was 
mere accident or coincidence) and thus did not have the 
potential to facilitate a drug-trafficking offense.3  See Loney, 
219 F.3d at 287.   
 
In deciding whether a defendant has successfully 
rebutted the presumptive relationship between firearms and 
drug-trafficking activities based on proximity alone, a 
sentencing court may look to any factors it deems relevant.  By 
 
3 Our concurring colleague suggests that this approach 
“mistakenly relieves the Government of its burden of proof” in 
criminal cases by requiring the defendant “to disprove a 
connection.”  Concurring Op. 10.  But the initial burden of 
proving that the presumption applies still rests with the 
Government.  It is only after the Government has carried its 
burden—by showing that the guns and drugs were physically 
near each other—that the defendant must disprove a 
connection.  This approach works much like an affirmative 
defense.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (providing an 
affirmative defense to a child pornography possession charge 
where the defendant possesses less than three images and 
promptly destroyed the images or reported the matter to law 
enforcement).  In that circumstance, the Government has the 
initial burden of proving all elements of a crime—but if it 
succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he or 
she is entitled to the defense.  As affirmative defenses in 
criminal cases do not typically offend the Constitution, see 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210–11 (1977), we 
discern no impermissible burden shifting here. 
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analogy, we have considered a similar presumption under 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)4 and identified factors that will 
ordinarily matter: (1) the type of gun involved, with handguns 
more likely to be connected with drug trafficking than hunting 
rifles; (2) whether the gun was loaded; (3) whether the gun was 
stored (or, we add, possessed) near the drugs or drug-related 
items; and (4) whether the gun was accessible.5  See United 
 
4 Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) is essentially the mirror 
image of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).  It provides that, in a conviction for 
unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, or trafficking 
of drugs, “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was 
possessed, increase [the offense level] by 2 levels.”  U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n 2018).  Thus the underlying offense for § 2D1.1(b)(1) 
is drug trafficking (with the enhancement applying to conduct 
involving a firearm), while the underlying offense for 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) is unlawful possession (etc.) of a firearm 
(with the enhancement applying to conduct involving drug 
trafficking, among other offenses).  But both enhancements 
potentially require a sentencing court to consider the 
connection between a defendant’s drug-trafficking activities 
and firearms.   
5 Our holding today is limited to the observation that these 
factors will often, though perhaps not always, be relevant to 
deciding whether § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies.  But not all 
authority concerning § 2D1.1(b)(1) will be relevant to 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), as the Commentary for § 2D1.1(b)(1) 
creates a special standard not present in Note 14(B).  See U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11 (U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n 2018) (providing that § 2D1.1(b)(1) 
should apply “if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly 
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense”).   
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States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2014).  We 
think these factors provide a helpful starting point for Note 
14(B) as well.  But again, the primary inquiry under 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) must be whether there is a relationship 
between the firearm and the defendant’s drug-trafficking 
offense.  See Loney, 219 F.3d at 287.  That relationship may be 
presumed if the firearm is found in close proximity to drugs or 
related items, but the defendant must have the opportunity to 
disprove it based on the facts of each case.   
 
We acknowledge that other circuits have interpreted 
Note 14(B) in dicta to mean that the enhancement 
“necessarily” or “automatically” applies when drugs and guns 
are physically near each other.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 692–93 (5th Cir. 2009); see also United 
States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
a nearby firearm “necessarily” has the potential to facilitate a 
drug-trafficking offense under Note 14(B)); United States v. 
Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Note 14(B) 
mandates application of the adjustment if guns and drugs are 
in the same location.”).  And at least two other circuits have 
directly held that for Note 14(B) “close proximity is all that is 
required.”  United States v. Paneto, 661 F.3d 709, 718 (1st Cir. 
2011); accord United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 92 
(11th Cir. 2013) (“A firearm found in close proximity to drugs 
or drug-related items simply ‘has’—without any requirement 
for additional evidence—the potential to facilitate the drug 
offense.” (emphasis in original)). 
 
Though this rule is consistent with the District Court’s 
approach here, we are unpersuaded by this position.  First, 
Loney is controlling precedent in our Circuit, and it squarely 
held that the “in connection with” requirement of 
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§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) necessarily excludes those cases in which the 
firearm’s presence was accidental or coincidental.  See 219 
F.3d at 287.  Under Loney we cannot, unlike our sister circuits, 
apply Note 14(B) without regard to that constraining 
consideration.  A contrary conclusion would impermissibly 
“expand[] the substantive law set forth in the [G]uidelines 
themselves.”  Nasir, 982 F.3d at 159. 
 
Second, as we already discussed, the text of Note 14 
itself does not require such a rigid construction.  It specifically 
directs sentencing courts to the reasoning behind the “close 
proximity” requirement: the firearm’s potential to facilitate 
drug-trafficking activity.  Smith made clear that a firearm does 
not have the potential to facilitate drug-trafficking activity if its 
presence was mere accident or coincidence.  See 508 U.S. at 
238.  And we have already interpreted “potential to facilitate” 
as requiring some kind of “relationship” between the firearm 
and the drug activity, which is also consistent with Note 14(E).  
See Loney, 219 F.3d at 287.  
 
Third, the courts that have discussed this issue in dicta 
may have interpreted Note 14(B) rigidly because they 
concluded that was the only way to distinguish it from Note 
14(A).  See, e.g., Jenkins, 566 F.3d at 163 (emphasizing the 
difference between Note 14(A) and (B)); Blankenship, 552 
F.3d at 705 (same).  Put differently, these courts may have 
believed that the only way to distinguish the two provisions 
was to conclude that Note 14(B) must automatically require the 
enhancement’s application when guns and drugs are in close 
proximity to each other.  But they did not have the benefit of 
Note 14(E), as it was added several years after they issued their 
24 
 
decisions.6  Plus our approach distinguishes Note 14(A) from 
(B)—as only the latter creates a presumption based on 
proximity—while still being true to the text of Note 14 itself 
and our holdings in Loney and West.   
 
* * * * * 
 Our holding here avoids the problem of a drug trafficker 
who coincidentally has a “hunting rifle buried in his closet.”  
Loney, 219 F.3d at 289.  Under Note 14(B), a sentencing court 
may presume that a firearm is used or possessed “in connection 
with” a drug-trafficking offense under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) if the 
firearm is found in close proximity to drugs or drug 
paraphernalia.  But the defendant must have a chance to prove 
that the firearm’s presence was mere accident or coincidence.  
Because Perez did not have that chance,7 we vacate the District 
Court’s judgment and sentence and remand for the Court to 
reconsider whether there was a relationship between Perez’s 
firearms and his drug-trafficking activities. 
 
6 Jenkins and Blankenship were decided in 2009; Note 14(E) 
was added in 2014.  See Harper, 766 F.3d at 747 (discussing 
Note 14(E)’s addition).   
7 The Government has not argued that any error on this point 
was harmless, perhaps because the application of an incorrect 
Guidelines range “rarely” meets this standard.  See United 
States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).  Thus the 
error here warrants remand. 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.  
Judges are not editors. When an agency interprets its own 
regulation, we must take its interpretation as we find it. Either 
it deserves Kisor deference as written or it does not.  
Here, Note 14(B) is invalid as written because it substitutes 
proximity for a connection to a drug crime. The majority ad-
mits that this reading of the Guideline would be unreasonable. 
So it misreads the Note to create a rebuttable presumption and 
then defers to its own creation. But that innovation generates 
its own problem. In criminal cases, the Government must prove 
every element of a crime and every fact that enhances a sen-
tence. Yet the majority’s rebuttable presumption flips that bur-
den, forcing Perez to disprove a connection between the gun 
and the drugs. If the evidence is scant or equal, the presumption 
defaults to raising his sentence. That is unjust. 
Because the majority’s reading does not square with the 
wording of the Note and reverses the burden of proof, I concur 
only in the judgment. 
I. NOTE 14(B) UNREASONABLY INTERPRETS  
THE REQUIRED “CONNECTION” BETWEEN  
THE GUN AND THE FELONY 
The Note does not fit the Guideline. The text of the Guide-
line requires a gun to relate to the other felony. But in drug 
cases, the Note deems that relationship present whenever the 
gun is found near drugs. Yet nearness alone does not make a 
gun relate to a crime. Because the Note strays too far from the 
Guideline that it claims to interpret, we should not defer to it. 
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A. The Guideline enhances a sentence only when the 
defendant’s gun possession relates to another felony 
causally or logically 
The Guideline authorizes a sentence enhancement only 
when the defendant possesses a gun or ammunition “in con-
nection with another felony.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 
“Connection” means a “causal or logical relation or sequence.” 
Connection (def. 1a), Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Diction-
ary (1988); accord Connexion (def. 3), Oxford English Dic-
tionary (2d ed. 1989) (“a bond of interdependence, causality, 
logical sequence, coherence, or the like”). If a drug dealer uses 
a gun to fight off a rival dealer (or packs heat because it might 
help him fight off rivals), the gun furthers his drug dealing.  
But closeness in time or space is not enough. Two strangers 
may sit next to each other on a plane for hours, yet no one 
would say they are travelling “in connection with” each other. 
A knife block may sit on a kitchen counter, next to a stove 
where a drug dealer cooks crack cocaine, yet have no “connec-
tion with” the crack.  
We held as much two decades ago, before the Sentencing 
Commission wrote Note 14(B). When we first interpreted the 
Guideline, we defined “in connection with” as “express[ing] 
some relationship or association, … such as a causal or logical” 
one. Loney, 219 F.3d at 284. Under that reading, the Guideline 
would reach a drug dealer caught carrying a handgun while 
selling drugs. Id. at 288. One could reasonably infer that he 
carried it to protect himself from drug-related violence. But the 
Guideline might well not apply if the drug dealer kept a hunting 
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rifle in his closet. Id. at 289. The rifle might not be bound up 
with the drug deal. 
That reading relied on the Supreme Court’s similar reading 
of a gun-crime law in Smith. Id. at 287 (quoting Smith v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a 
defendant earns a mandatory extra sentence if he uses or carries 
a gun “during and in relation to” a violent or drug-trafficking 
crime. For gun possession to be “in relation to” drug traffick-
ing, the gun “must have some purpose or effect” on that crime. 
Smith, 508 U.S. at 238. Put another way, the gun must facili-
tate, or at least potentially facilitate, that crime. Id. Accidental 
or coincidental gun possession is not enough. Id.  
In short, a gun is not possessed “in connection with” a crime 
unless it is somehow “involved in” or “related to” it. Loney, 219 
F.3d at 284 (quoting Oxford English Dictionary). The text of 
the Guideline asks whether the gun related to the crime caus-
ally or logically. 
B. In drug-trafficking cases, the Note calls for an  
enhancement whenever a gun is found near drugs 
Though the Guideline requires us to ask about causation 
and purpose, Note 14(B) adopts per se rules for burglary and 
drug cases. In drug-trafficking cases, the Note applies the en-
hancement whenever “a firearm is found in close proximity to 
drugs.” It applies even if the gun had no effect on a crime, and 
even if the defendant had the gun for reasons unrelated to the 
crime. The gun need only be nearby, even accidentally or  
coincidentally. 
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C. Because the Note does not fit within  
the Guideline’s “zone of ambiguity,”  
it is not entitled to Kisor deference  
Kisor reminded courts not to defer reflexively to an 
agency’s reading of its own regulation. 139 S. Ct. at 2415. Be-
fore Kisor, we gave an agency’s reading “controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-
tion.” Id. at 2411 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). Kisor deference, we have held, 
applies to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary on the 
Guidelines. Nasir, 982 F.3d at 158–59. 
So now, we must first confirm that the Guideline is ambig-
uous. Id. at 2415. To do that, we have to “exhaust all the ‘tra-
ditional tools’ of construction.” Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A. 
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). If those tools 
yield only one answer, the Guideline’s text controls, not the 
Commission’s later reading. If not, the text is ambiguous. 
Second, even if there is an ambiguity, the Commission’s 
reading must be reasonable. Id. at 2415–16. The Commission 
cannot choose a meaning that has been ruled out. In other 
words, its reading must fall within the remaining “zone of am-
biguity.” Id. Only then can we defer to it. (Kisor also lists other 
requirements that are not implicated here. Id. at 2416–18.)  
Yet the majority treats the Guideline as ambiguous without 
first examining the text. True, the phrase “in connection with” 
is “broad” and “expansive.” Maj. Op. 10 (quoting Loney, 219 
F.3d at 284) (brackets omitted). But “a term … is not ambigu-
ous merely because it is broad in scope.” In re Phila. 
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Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, the 
text has a single core meaning: a causal or logical relationship, 
not a spatial one. Loney, 219 F.3d at 284; see also Da Silva v. 
Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 629, 635–36 & n.34 (3d Cir. 2020) (hold-
ing that, in immigration law, “connected to” unambiguously 
means “having a causal or logical relationship”) (citing Loney). 
So the text is not ambiguous. 
Even if there were any ambiguity, it would be about the 
type of relationship required, either causal or logical: whether 
the gun must have enabled the defendant to commit the crime 
or just potentially helped him do so. 
Under the plain text, the defendant’s gun possession must 
be involved with and related to the other felony. Yet the Note 
extends well beyond a causal or logical link to a crime. It au-
thorizes the enhancement whenever the gun is found near 
drugs. But under the Guideline’s text, just being nearby is not 
enough. This spatial relationship falls outside any textual am-
biguity because it does not ensure a causal or logical relation-
ship between the gun and the crime. So the Note improperly 
“expands the [Guideline’s] substantive law.” Nasir, 982 F.3d 
at 159. It deserves no deference. 
The majority disagrees, holding that the Note controls. Yet 
it agrees that “the Note would be unreasonable if it applied” as 
I have described it. Maj. Op. 11. And it agrees that Loney cor-
rectly defined the “connection” standard. See id. at 19–20. The 
majority defers to the Note only because it misreads the Note’s 
clear rule.  
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II. THE MAJORITY MISREADS THE NOTE 
The Note provides: 
14. Application of Subsections (b)(6)(B) and (c)(1). – 
… 
(B) Application When Other Offense is Burglary or 
Drug Offense. –  
Subsections (b)(6)(B) and (c)(1) apply  
… 
(ii) in the case of a drug trafficking offense in which a 
firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug- 
manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia.  
In these cases, application of subsections (b)(6)(B) and, if 
the firearm was cited in the offense of conviction, (c)(1) 
is warranted because the presence of the firearm has the 
potential of facilitating another felony offense or another 
offense, respectively. 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B) (emphasis and line breaks 
added).  
The italicized clause sets forth a clear rule. Yet the majority 
sets aside the plain meaning of the Note, adopted by the Dis-
trict Court, the parties, and every circuit to consider the issue. 
Instead, it turns the Note’s rationale into part of the rule. And 
with no textual basis, it transforms the Note’s rule into a rebut-
table presumption. 
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A. The majority misreads the Note’s last sentence as 
limiting the close-proximity rule 
Under the Note’s rule (italicized above), the enhancement 
“appl[ies]” when “a firearm is found in close proximity to 
drugs”—period. The next sentence explains not what the 
Note’s rule requires, but why: this per se rule “is warranted 
because the presence of the firearm has the potential of facili-
tating another” crime. Id. (emphasis added). 
So the Note’s last sentence is a rationale: the Commission 
crafted the per se rule “because” the gun could facilitate an-
other crime. Id. The Note treats that as true whenever a gun is 
near drugs. Under the Note, a sentencing judge need not also 
find that the gun’s presence was deliberate or that the gun in 
fact could have facilitated drug trafficking. Whenever guns are 
found near drugs, it says, the enhancement applies “automati-
cally.” Jeffries, 587 F.3d at 692–93. 
Yet the majority reads this rationale into the rule. The ma-
jority says that the last sentence “provides that the Note should 
apply in cases where ‘the presence of the firearm has the po-
tential of facilitating’ a drug-trafficking offense.” Maj. Op. 17 
(emphasis added). That phrase, it claims, “necessarily excludes 
cases in which the presence of firearms was merely acci-
dental.” Id. at 12. But that rationale is not part of the rule. The 
structure of the Note makes that clear. 
Indeed, the District Court did not read the explanation to 
limit the rule. At oral argument, the Government agreed: the 
Note sets forth “a very clear rule.” Oral Arg. Tr. 30. The de-
fendant’s purpose does not matter. Id. at 31. If a drug dealer’s 
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hunting rifle is near the drugs, even coincidentally, “this en-
hancement applies.” Id. And as the majority concedes, our sis-
ter circuits uniformly read the Note as applying the enhance-
ment automatically whenever drugs are near guns. Maj. Op. 
22. Though my colleagues try to distinguish these cases, their 
efforts fail.  
True, years later, the Commission did add a separate sub-
section to Note 14. That subsection, 14(E), tells courts to con-
sider the relationship between the two crimes before applying 
the enhancement. But this general instruction does not repeal 
or amend 14(B)’s drug-specific per se rule. Because a general 
rule does not displace a more specific one, 14(B), not 14(E), 
governs cases involving drugs and guns. See, e.g., Green v. 
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989). And 
14(B) states that the Guideline applies whenever guns are 
found near drugs—no relationship required. 
The majority also says that only this circuit is bound by 
Loney’s holding that the Guideline cannot cover accidental or 
coincidental firearms. Maj. Op. 22. But Loney predates 14(B). 
And “prior judicial constructions of a particular guideline can-
not prevent the Commission from adopting a conflicting inter-
pretation.” Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46, overruled in irrelevant part 
by Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2411 n.3, 2414–18. So Loney does not 
tell us how to read 14(B). I agree that Loney’s reading is rea-
sonable. But rather than relying on that case to misread the 
Note, I would just hold that 14(B)’s conflicting reading is un-
reasonable and unworthy of deference. 
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B. The majority turns the Note’s conclusive  
presumption into a rebuttable one 
Compounding its error, the majority treats the Note as cre-
ating a rebuttable presumption. On its reading, if a gun is found 
near drugs, courts should presume that the defendant possessed 
the gun in connection with the drug crime. The defendant can 
then rebut that presumption by disproving a relationship be-
tween the gun and the drugs. Maj. Op. 17–19.  
But the text does not say that. And no other circuit has 
adopted this novel approach. The majority cites three circuits 
that call this rule a presumption, but they do not call it rebutta-
ble. Rather, because the Note applies “automatically” when 
guns are near drugs, these courts treat the presumption as con-
clusive. Eaden, 914 F.3d at 1008–09 (citing Jeffries, 587 F.3d 
at 692). Plus, at oral argument, the Government rejected the 
majority’s reading: “[I]t is not a rebuttable presumption under 
the guideline.” Oral Arg. Tr. 27. So did Perez, who read the 
note as a “very clear strict liability” rule. Id. at 38. The parties 
got that right. 
III. THE MAJORITY SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF ONTO 
THE DEFENDANT 
The majority’s rewrite makes Perez bear a burden of dis-
proof. The burden of proving every element of a crime rests on 
the Government. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 
(1977). The same is true for Sentencing Guidelines. United 
States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 2018). This 
Guideline’s plain text requires the Government to prove that 
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the defendant used or possessed a gun or ammunition “in con-
nection with” another felony. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 
As the majority agrees, a gun can be close to drugs without 
being connected to drug trafficking. See Maj. Op. 16. Yet in 
these cases, it lets the Government prove mere proximity. 
Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove a connec-
tion. That approach mistakenly relieves the Government of its 
burden of proof. 
This legal presumption differs from a mere factual infer-
ence. Factually, a district court may choose to infer that a gun 
is connected to nearby drugs. Often, that will be obvious, as 
when a drug dealer carries it in his holster or keeps an arsenal 
right next to his stash. See Loney, 219 F.3d at 288 (affirming 
similar factual inferences before the Note was added); United 
States v. Spurgeon, 117 F.3d 641, 643–44 (2d Cir. 1997) (per 
curiam) (same). But a factual inference is permissive. The 
court can find that a gun under the mattress is connected to 
drugs across the room—but it need not. Plus, a factual infer-
ence leaves the burden of proof where it belongs: on the Gov-
ernment.  
Rather than create a legal presumption, we should remand 
to let the District Court draw whatever inference it finds war-
ranted on the facts. But if the evidence is equally balanced, the 
tie should go to the defendant. Because depriving someone of 
his liberty is a severe sanction, our system of laws demands 
that the Government bear the burden of proof. By rewriting the 
text of Note 14(B), the majority strips away this bulwark. 
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* * * * * 
Perez had guns near drugs but insists that they were uncon-
nected. He should be able to make this argument on remand. 
Note 14(B) should neither determine the outcome nor create a 
legal presumption that he must rebut. 
The Note (and the majority’s approach) may be sensible 
policy, reflecting the inherent danger of having guns near 
drugs. But that policy decision belongs in the Guidelines, after 
notice and comment, not in the Note. Because the Note de-
serves no deference, I respectfully concur only in the judgment.  
